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Trampling Whose Rights? Democratic Majority
Rule and Racial Minorities: A Response
to Chin and Wagner
Taunya Lovell Banks*
“There is no thinking of America except as a body politic haunted by
the historic presence of the African. . . . It has always been impossible to
vote in the United States . . . without symbolically casting a ballot for or
against American racism . . . .”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In his tribute to the legendary singer James Brown, New York Times
columnist Bob Herbert wrote that Brown’s 1968 recording I’m Black and I’m
Proud captured the optimism of that era: “Despite the continuing plague of
racism, there were dreams in the 1960s of fabulous days ahead for black
Americans, days in which the stereotypes and degradation of the past would
be erased by a new era of educational, professional and cultural achieve-
ment.”2 The optimism of black Americans in the late 1960s probably mir-
rored the optimism of their ancestors following ratification of the Thirteenth3
and Fourteenth4 Amendments and anticipation of the Fifteenth Amendment5
to the United States Constitution a hundred years earlier.
Black nineteenth-century optimism was short-lived. The Reconstruction
Era ended abruptly in the mid-1870s along with the promise of full and
equal citizenship for black Americans. In explaining the confluence of cir-
* Jacob A. France Professor of Equality Jurisprudence, University of Maryland School of
Law.  I am grateful for the helpful comments from Maxwell Chibundu, Sharon Keller, partici-
pants in the Half Baked Ideas lunch, Sherrilyn Ifill, David Bogen and the journal editors, as
well as the research assistance of Susan McCarthy.
1 Grant Farred, America’s Africa: Barack Obama and the Aporia of Race, 8 SAFUNDI: THE
J. OF S. AFR. & AM. STUD. 103, 103 (2007).
2 Bob Herbert, Lessons Never Learned, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2006, at A35.  He continues:
Those dreams did not include visions of an enormous economically disadvantaged
population that would continue to live in poverty, or near-poverty, more than 40
years later; or a perennially ragged public school system, largely segregated in fact,
if not by law, that would turn out generation after generation of educationally de-
prived children; or a black prison population so vast and so enduring it would come
to seem normal to legions of black youngsters, actually dictating to a great extent
their tastes in fashion, art and music; or a level of sustained violence that has con-
demned thousands upon thousands of black youngsters to an early grave.
Id.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
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cumstances that resulted in “the Nadir” for black Americans,6 Derrick Bell
writes:
Called upon to decide pressing questions concerning the relations
of labor and capital, the power of state legislatures, and the rights
of big business, the courts foreswore impartiality and came down
heavily on the side of economic interests. . . . In the 1880s, Ameri-
can society was rife with social tensions. . . . Immigrants in the
North and blacks in the South were seen as corrupting forces or
entities to be discounted in the formulation of public policy. Popu-
lar democracy and, with it, universal suffrage became suspect, and
a return to property and literacy qualification was urged.7
In addition, the late nineteenth-century United States Supreme Court, in
a series of cases culminating in Plessy v. Ferguson,8 affirmed policies, prac-
tices, and legal principles that crushed black Americans’ expectations of full
and equal citizenship.9
Gabriel Chin and Randy Wagner, in their article, The Tyranny of the
Minority: Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty,10 remind us
that there were black majorities in Deep South states during Reconstruction,
reviving and revivifying that idea.11 They explain that legal scholars and
courts treat allegations of race discrimination by black Americans as minor-
ity group claims reachable through the Constitution under the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.12 But non-constitutional claims by
minorities “are . . . subject to unrestricted majoritarian control.”13 Even
when constitutional violations are alleged, the Supreme Court asserts that its
6 DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 44 n.3 (5th ed. 2004) (citing
RAYFORD W. LOGAN, BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO (1965), originally published as THE NEGRO IN
AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT: THE NADIR, 1877-1901 (1954)).
7 Id. at 44-45.
8 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding racially separate but equal facilities mandated by law do
not violate the equal protection clause).
9 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not reach private discriminatory acts); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (hold-
ing that the Fourteenth Amendment does not empower the federal government to criminalize
actions by private citizens against fellow state citizens); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1876) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Bill of Rights);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment does not
guarantee blacks the right to vote, but only the right not to be excluded from the franchise due
to race); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (distinguishing between state and
federal citizenship with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause).
10 Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (2008).
11 Chin and Wagner assert that while blacks were a political minority nationally, in the
second half of the nineteenth century they were “an absolute majority” in three southern states
(Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina) and “the largest single voting bloc” in four other
states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Virginia), in which blacks constituted “over 40% of the
population.” Id. at 66.
12 Id. at 80.
13 Id. at 74.
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ability to protect minorities in a democracy is limited by concerns about
whether the Court’s action poses “a potential threat to the legitimate prerog-
atives of majorities.”14 Alexander Bickel labels this phenomenon the
“counter-majoritarian difficulty.”15
Chin and Wagner describe how southern blacks’ hopes for the full bene-
fits of American citizenship in the late nineteenth century were undermined
by a combination of private and governmental actions which effectively dis-
enfranchised them through discriminatory laws, force, and fraud.16 Anti-
black policies and practices of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
reflected the political will of southern white pluralities or bare majorities.
Southern blacks, although a majority or plurality, were politically powerless,
unable to prevent the myriad of racial segregation policies that impaired
their ability to prosper into the late twentieth century.
The authors conclude that the disenfranchisement of southern black ma-
jorities or pluralities constitutes a form of state action that is cognizable
under the Constitution.17 They posit that given the direction of the Recon-
struction governments, Jim Crow policies might not have limited the educa-
tional, economic, and political opportunities of black Americans had blacks
not been disenfranchised.18 Thus, they argue that “all or almost all of the acts
of private discrimination which are now characterized by . . . the Supreme
Court as ‘general societal discrimination’ occurred only because of prior vio-
lations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. If so [private acts of
discrimination] are within the power of Congress to remedy.”19
Chin and Wagner acknowledge the Court’s own language about the im-
portance of the vote to political citizenship,20 but assert that “when the Court
upheld race-based discrimination and disenfranchisement” targeting black
14 Id. at 73 (citing Ralph Bischoff, Minority Rights and Majority Rule, 39 VA. L. REV.
607, 612 (1953)).
15 Id. at 67 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SU-
PREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986)).
16 Id. at 80-97.
17 Id. at 96-97.
18 Some might question whether protection of black enfranchisement in the South during
the late nineteenth century would have prevented this disadvantage given the hardened racial
attitudes of the time and the widespread use of intimidation and violence to expel blacks from
towns and counties, or discourage voters. Although black Americans might have been able to
elect law enforcement officials, history indicates that hostile whites willingly used intimida-
tion, economic coercion, and violence to undercut the voting power of black Americans,
whether majorities or minorities. For a discussion of this point, see generally JAMES W.
LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM (2005) (arguing that
between 1890 and 1968 thousands of communities across the United States systematically
excluded blacks from living in them). Even the authors concede that federal intervention to
protect black voters during this period was “diminish[ing].” Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, R
at 89.
19 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 105. R
20 Id. at 97 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1896)).
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Americans it “knew what it was doing.”21 The Court’s record shows that “it
consciously upheld laws passed by [white] minorities, against the will of
[black] majorities [or pluralities], who because of their race had been de-
nied the right to vote.”22
On the eve of the Second World War, Justice Harlan Stone, writing for
the Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,23 opened a small door
for relief. In the now famous Footnote 4 of that decision, Justice Stone indi-
cated that heightened judicial scrutiny might apply to certain government
actions that distort the political process or discriminate against politically
powerless “discrete and insular minorities.”24 From this footnote developed
a line of cases where the Court, reluctant to override “democratic decisions”
even when they adversely affected the rights of politically powerless minori-
21 Id. at 110. Akhil Reed Amar recounts the Supreme Court’s consistent disregard for the
rights of blacks in America. He writes, “[T]he Philadelphia Constitution was pro-slavery, but
the Taney Court was far worse, and grossly dismissive of the rights of free blacks. The Waite/
Fuller Court damned government-sponsored integration in the Civil Rights Cases and blessed
government-sponsored segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.” Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme
Court 1999 Term – Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 65
(2000). He continues, “And the Civil Rights Cases remain good law in the year 2000, paving
the way for the Court to invalidate yet another congressional civil rights law . . . .” Id. at 66.
22 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 110. Chin and Wagner use several key late-nineteenth R
and early-twentieth-century cases to support their point. Id. at 110-15 (citing Giles v. Teasley,
193 U.S. 146 (1904); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S.
213 (1898); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877)).
23 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
24 Id. at 152-53, 152 n.4. The pertinent text of the footnote reads:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Consti-
tution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth . . . . It is unnecessary to consider
now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordina-
rily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation . . . . Nor need we enquire
whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular
religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities . . . . ; whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.
Id. For a discussion of Footnote 4, see generally Jack M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L.
REV. 275 (1989); Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982) (discussing earlier drafts of the note, the first of which Lusky
wrote as a clerk to Justice Stone); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (1982) (“Professor Fiss . . .  has termed Footnote 4 of Carolene
Products ‘the great and modern charter for ordering the relations between judges and other
agencies of government’ . . . . [T]he influence of Footnote 4 cannot be measured accurately by
simple enumeration of cases in which it has been cited. Nonetheless, I have counted at least
twenty-eight cases in which Footnote 4 has been cited in a majority, concurring, or dissenting
opinion of the Supreme Court.”) (citation omitted).
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ties, balanced minority rights against those of the political majority.25 The
Court asked in each case whether democratic principles of majority rule
must give way in order to prevent the majority from “trampling the rights”
of the discrete minority group.
Based on their examination of nineteenth-century black disenfranchise-
ment, Chin and Wagner argue that the contemporary Court, when weighing
remedies for the consequences of race discrimination, should not character-
ize black claimants as a minority whose claims trigger a test that balances
their rights against those of the “white majority.” They reason that the “state
action” that resulted in the disputed policy or practice subverted the will of
the real political majority in those communities.26 Thus the authors write:
The law must grapple with the lasting consequences of eight de-
cades of tyranny . . . [because] today’s African Americans are not
in the position they would have been had their ancestors voted. . . .
The nation and the states that participated in the disenfranchise-
ment of democratic majorities are both entitled and obligated to
consider what the law would look like, and what African Ameri-
cans would look like, had minority tyranny not occurred.27
The authors argue persuasively that the constitutional harm blacks ex-
perienced, “‘discrimination,’ in the sense of segregation, exclusion from
equal opportunities and . . . mainstream institutions of society,”28 reflects the
widespread belief that black “Americans were [not] entitled to shape the
state governments, legal systems, and economies in which they found them-
25 For a sample of Supreme Court cases citing Footnote 4, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468-69 (1991); United
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291, 294 (1978); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14
(1976); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642-43, 655-58 (1973); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
26 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 96-97. The authors’ characterization of state action, R
however, is quite broad. They write: “[T]o the extent that violent or fraudulent disenfranchise-
ment was the result of truly private action, those private citizens or their co-conspirators be-
came officeholders. They continued their policies of disenfranchisement, legal and extralegal.”
Id. at 97. Some legal scholars might take issue with this conclusion. The Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments were intended primarily to protect blacks from “state actions” that denied
blacks equal protection of the laws and the right to vote. The Supreme Court in the Civil Rights
Cases ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to private actions. 109 U.S. 3
(1883). This very narrow interpretation of state action initially allowed the Court to character-
ize political party primaries that excluded black voters as private discriminatory acts. See
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). Then, in a series of cases culminating in Smith v.
Allwright, the Court developed the “public function” doctrine whereby certain functions tradi-
tionally performed by government retain their public character even when performed by pri-
vate actors. 321 U.S. 649, 659-61 (1944). The private actions Chin and Wagner refer to do not
seem to fit even under this broader interpretation of state action.
27 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 125. R
28 Id. at 76.
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selves.”29 Thus, one obvious explanation for the political repression of black
voters in the nineteenth and early twentieth century comes from a fear of
majority rule. The Fifteenth Amendment allowed voters who were previ-
ously excluded from the political process to vote as a bloc or as a majority,
thereby threatening the governing hierarchy. But Chin and Wagner’s discus-
sion also suggests another explanation.
Today, despite the lack of state-wide black majorities or substantial plu-
ralities, exclusion or disenfranchisement of black voters is a means of main-
taining control and denying black voters equal political citizenship rights.
While I agree with Chin and Wagner that the counter-majoritarian principle
has been misapplied by the Court in race discrimination cases involving
black Americans, I take issue with their explanation. Fear of black majority
rule was not the sole reason for black disenfranchisement efforts in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. If it had been, disenfranchisement
efforts would have decreased as the percentage of black voters in the states
decreased. Yet, as even Chin and Wagner concede, efforts to disenfranchise
black voters have continued into the twenty-first century in the absence of
black majorities or pluralities in the former states of the confederacy. Thus, I
contend that black disenfranchisement on both a local and national level is
linked to resistance by white racial conservatives to full political equality for
black Americans (and often other non-white racial/ethnic minorities).
Further, Chin and Wagner seem overly optimistic in believing that the
problem with the minority model analysis is simply the Court’s unwilling-
ness to recognize the lingering effects of disenfranchised black majorities or
pluralities. Continued resistance among white racial conservatives (whose
interests are currently favored by the federal courts)30 to full political equal-
ity for black Americans makes it unlikely that “law” will grapple with the
consequences of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century black disen-
franchisement anytime in the near future. For as the authors admit, “the
Court furthered counter-majoritarian politics, and it was itself the product of
counter-majoritarian politics.”31
I contend that the Court continues to further the rights of white racial
conservative minorities nationally and locally. The key question is how to
preserve and protect the political rights of a long-despised racialized minor-
ity. One possible approach is to argue that given the long and well docu-
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Paul Butler, A Symposium on the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court: Rehnquist,
Racism and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1029-32, 1039-42 (2006); Dan
Carney & Alexander Starr, New Order in the Court, BUS. WK., Apr. 23, 2001, at 88; Neil A.
Lewis, Mixed Results for Bush in Battles Over Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A1; Neil
A. Lewis & David Johnston, Bush Would Sever Law Group’s Role in Screening Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, March 17, 2001, at A1; John Nichols, Karl Rove’s Legal Tricks: Packing the Judiciary
with Right-Wingers, THE NATION, July 22, 2002, at 11; Roger Clegg, Picking the Next Justice,
NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Apr. 19, 2002, http://nationalreview.com/clegg/clegg041902.asp (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2007).
31 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 117-18. R
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mented history of efforts to disenfranchise blacks and suppress the black
vote, the Court’s minority model analysis is inappropriate in voting rights
cases.
More specifically, in this essay I argue that the Court’s application of
the minority model rule and invocation of counter-majoritarian concerns in
cases where black majorities or pluralities in local communities voluntarily
attempt to remedy past discrimination, or where they coalesce with whites to
achieve this result, suggests continued resistance to guaranteeing black citi-
zens the same rights as white citizens in America.
First, I argue that efforts to disenfranchise black voters locally continue
with the Court’s approval without regard to the political numbers of black
voters. To illustrate this point, I briefly examine the documented disen-
franchisement of black voters during the 2000 and 2004 presidential elec-
tions. Second, I argue that even where blacks are able to enact policies to
remedy the consequences of past disenfranchisement through democratic
processes, the Court sides with complaining whites. My examination of two
modern cases, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.32 and Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education,33 suggests that the “democratic majority” the Court
protects is the dominant white culture, whose conservative members con-
tinue to be hostile to the idea of meaningful black participation in demo-
cratic processes.
Finally, I use the quest by black parents for educational equality as a
contemporary example of how black political will continues to be thwarted
as a result of long-term formal and informal disenfranchisement efforts. I
conclude, rather cynically, that it may be of no moment for democratic
majoritarian proponents that potential Southern black majorities were disen-
franchised in some parts of the country because the situation southern blacks
faced mirrored nation-wide attitudes toward the inclusion of black Ameri-
cans generally in the political community. This attitude continues today. Ap-
plication of the minority model analysis, therefore, only further undercuts
black voting rights.
II. THE CHIN-WAGNER ARGUMENT EXAMINED
A. Disenfranchised Black Political Majorities
“[T]he most dangerous threat to democracy is the Negro. . . . The
Negro is an uncontrollable objector to our [all-white] ticket.”
— The Commercial, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, 189234
32 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
33 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
34 After the Supreme Court outlawed the all-white primary, this Arkansas newspaper edi-
tor urged its white readers to support the poll tax, which would effectively disenfranchise
many black voters. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disen-
franchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 732 (1998) (citing C. Calvin
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According to Chin and Wagner, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments were enacted to protect blacks from white majority oppression.35 But
if their reading of the historical record is accurate, then the failure of the
Supreme Court to adequately protect black voters seems puzzling. Some al-
ternate explanation is possible.
This section briefly describes the historical setting of these two amend-
ments. It concludes that evidence about the purpose of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments is more ambiguous than Chin and Wagner acknowl-
edge. Scholars agree only that the amendments were designed to clarify the
legal position of blacks by overruling Dred Scott v. Sanford,36 by declaring
black Americans citizens, and by prohibiting any blanket exclusion of blacks
from the franchise. Whether a majority of the national legislators and the
ratifying states thought these amendments granted black Americans equal
political status with whites is less clear.
Undoubtedly, some members of Congress intended the amendments to
grant blacks equal access to the franchise, but Chin and Wagner overlook the
lack of consensus in the Reconstruction Congress on this point. The intent of
the ratifying states is no clearer. Instead, the atmosphere surrounding the
enactment and ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments re-
flected mixed feelings within Congress and the states about the scope of
black inclusion into the American body politic.37
Books have been written exploring the “original intent” of the Four-
teenth Amendment.38 There is no consensus on what Congress intended
Smith, The Politics of Evasion: Arkansas’ Reaction to Smith v. Allwright, 1944, 17 J. NEGRO
HIST. 40, 41 (1982)).
35 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 68-70. R
36 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
37 See CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 3-4 (1997); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737,
1746-48 (2007); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Deci-
sion, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955). Desmond King and Stephen Tuck argue forcefully “that
Southern white supremacy was constructed in conjunction with, rather than in opposition to
developments in the rest of the country after Reconstruction.” Desmond King & Stephen Tuck,
De-Centering the South: America’s Nationwide White Supremacist Order After Reconstruc-
tion, 194 PAST & PRESENT 213, 214 (2007).
38 See, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1997); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1981); JAMES EDWARD BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECON-
STRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997); FREDERICK P.
LEWIS, THE DILEMMA IN THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENFORCE THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1980); HERMINE HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: JUDICIAL EROSION OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE MISUSE OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
 Reflecting disagreement about the intent of the amendment, ratification was not without
controversy. Five southern states and two border states (Maryland and Delaware) resisted rati-
fication of the Fourteenth Amendment that required them to guarantee all people, including
blacks, equal protection of the law. “The amendment was subsequently ratified by Alabama,
July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868 (after having rejected it on November 9, 1866); Virginia,
October 8, 1869 (after having rejected it on January 9, 1867); Mississippi, January 17, 1870;
Texas, February 18, 1870 (after having rejected it on October 27, 1866); Delaware, February
12, 1901 (after having rejected it on February 8, 1867); Maryland, April 4, 1959 (after having
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other than clarification of black Americans’ citizenship status.39 This uncer-
tainty about its meaning and scope left the matter open to interpretation by
the Supreme Court. The late nineteenth-century Court severely limited the
Fourteenth Amendment’s scope by reasoning that the amendment did not
reach private acts of discrimination,40 the most common manifestation of
anti-black bias, and by distinguishing between state and federal citizenship
with respect to the Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.41
The history of the Fifteenth Amendment is similar. Chin and Wagner
write that Congress proposed the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869 because the
former Confederate states had unanimously refused to enfranchise black
Americans in spite of the threat in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to reduce congressional representation.42 But resistance to enfranchising
black voters was not limited to the South and predated the Civil War.
Although a few northern blacks voted at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury,43 most were quickly disenfranchised during the first half of the nine-
teenth century as a byproduct of the movement toward universal white male
suffrage.44 “By 1865, at the end of the Civil War, only five states allowed
rejected it on March 23, 1867); California, May 6, 1959; Kentucky, March 18, 1976 (after
having rejected it on January 8, 1867).” National Park Service, 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution Proposal and Ratification, available at http://www.nps.gov/archive/malu/docu-
ments/amend14.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). New Jersey, Oregon and Ohio subsequently
rescinded their ratifying votes. Id.
39 James Thomas Tucker writes that while it was clear that the Thirteenth Amendment
overruled that portion of “the Dred Scott decision to the extent it allowed the federal govern-
ment to deprive slave owners of their ‘property’ . . .  there was widespread disagreement over
whether the effects of the Amendment went any further.”  James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of
the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 474 (1999).  Tucker goes on to discuss how the Fourteenth Amend-
ment clarified the citizenship status of black Americans and how the privileges and immuni-
ties, equal protection and due process clauses “gave specific meaning to American
citizenship.” Id. at 479. Northerners were concerned that the grant of citizenship to blacks, the
vast majority of whom resided in the South, would shift even more power to the South than the
Three-Fifths Clause of Article I and questioned whether the Fourteenth Amendment gave Con-
gress the right “‘to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, or . . . act directly on the
subject.’ . . . [Further] black suffrage in the northern states was a practical impossibility be-
cause of its unpopularity.” Id. at 480. More importantly, Tucker, quoting John Mabry Ma-
thews, the leading authority on the Fifteenth Amendment for the first half of the twentieth
century, writes “that politics not principle was the dominant factor [explaining the enactment
of that amendment] . . . . ‘The Fifteenth Amendment had a limited object—first, to enfranchise
the northern Negro, and second, to protect the southern Negro against disenfranchisement.’”
Id. at 483-84 (quoting JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-21, 77, 50 (1909)).
40 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1883).
41 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
42 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 88. R
43 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOC-
RACY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2000). Of course, these early black voters had to satisfy prop-
erty and other restrictions. Id.
44 See LEON LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY 74, 79 (1961); David Skillen Bogen, The Ma-
ryland Context of Dred Scott: The Decline in the Legal Status of Maryland Free Blacks 1776-
1810, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 381, 396-403 (1990) (discussing the loss of franchise for free
blacks in Maryland).
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black men to vote on the same basis as white men.”45 The debate over the
Fifteenth Amendment, then, occurred in an atmosphere of considerable an-
tagonism toward black enfranchisement.
Extending the franchise to all adult black men met resistance in all re-
gions of the country, not just in the South.46 The language of the Fifteenth
Amendment reflects the controversy. Rather than guarantee blacks the right
to vote outright, Section 1 of the amendment provides: “The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”47 In other words, the right to vote could be conditioned on things
other than race. Property requirements, poll taxes, literacy tests, felony dis-
qualification, or disenfranchisement laws — which Chin and Wagner con-
cede were used to suppress the black vote — were permissible if crafted as
race-neutral voting requirements.
Even some northern states resisted ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment.48
Several years after enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and more
than one hundred years after the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, two
border states, Maryland and Kentucky, became the last states to ratify the
amendment.49 The ratification history of the Fifteenth Amendment reflects
the continued resistance to black enfranchisement in states that were not part
of the former confederacy.
The Fifteenth Amendment’s seemingly weak endorsement of the black
franchise resonated in Supreme Court decisions. Chin and Wagner discuss
how the Court limited the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment by refusing to
extend the amendment’s protection to private actors50 and how the Court in a
45 King & Tuck, supra note 37, at 220 (citing Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., Northern Prejudice and R
Negro Suffrage, 1865-1870, 39 J. NEGRO HIST. 12 (1954)). King and Tuck continue: “Out
West, the four thousand black Californians were barred from voting, jury service, testifying in
court, homesteading or marrying across the colour line.” Id.
46 The 39th Congress made enfranchisement of black adult males a requirement for read-
mission of the former confederate states to the Union. For a discussion of this process, see
Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 269-
73 (2004). But states outside the Deep South governed by Democrats refused to extend the
franchise to blacks. King & Tuck, supra note 37, at 220 (citing Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., Northern R
Prejudice and Negro Suffrage, 1865-1870, 39 J. NEGRO HIST. 12 (1954)). Only when the
interests of white Republicans were threatened during the 1868 presidential election did the
Republican-dominated Reconstruction Congress consider a constitutional amendment to pro-
tect black voters. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 29 (2004).  Members of Congress needed the black
vote to counteract a resurrected southern-influenced Democratic party, but they also wanted to
control access to the franchise. Id. at 29.
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
48 Six states outside the Deep South (California, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon,
and Tennessee) rejected the Fifteenth Amendment outright, and New York rescinded its adop-
tion.  14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Proposal and Ratification, available at http://
www.nps.gov/archive/malu/documents/amend15.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
49 Id.
50 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 96 (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953); R
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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series of cases upheld techniques that permanently disenfranchised black
voters.51 In one of the most egregious cases, Giles v. Harris, the Court re-
fused to invalidate an Alabama constitutional provision effectively disen-
franchising black voters, explaining that the Court was powerless to remedy
the claimed violation.52
Chin and Wagner discuss this case, and Giles v. Teasley, where the peti-
tioners more clearly spelled out that what was at stake was the right of a
controlling plurality.53 A disingenuous Supreme Court in Giles v. Harris told
petitioners to seek relief from a southern-dominated Congress or President
Theodore Roosevelt.54 Even worse, despite a record replete with supportive
evidence of intent to disenfranchise black voters, the Court in Giles v. Teas-
ley wrote that, assuming the allegations were true, the petitioners had not
been injured.55 As Chin and Wagner point out, the Court, in an illogical
twist, explained that it would not intervene on behalf of the disenfranchised
black voters because no state official could lawfully deny otherwise quali-
fied black voters the franchise.56  Nevertheless, the authors characterize the
Court’s action in the Giles cases as passive, although “not virtuous.”57
But as Chin and Wagner point out, the Supreme Court in the late nine-
teenth century acknowledged “the centrality of the right to vote . . . ‘re-
garded as a fundamental political right . . . preservative of all rights.’” 58 In
the 1960s the Court reinforced this idea, explaining that “[o]ther rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”59 Given
the importance the Court consistently placed on the right to vote before its
decisions in the Giles cases, its failure to protect the black petitioner’s right
to vote seems more than the passive act Chin and Wagner call it. The Giles
51 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 114-16 (discussing Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 R
(1904); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898)).
52 189 U.S. 475 (1903).  According to the Court, anyone who had registered to vote before
January 1, 1903, was registered for life and would not be subject to the literacy requirements of
the later law.
[B]efore 1903 the following male citizens of the State, who are citizens of the
United States, were entitled to register, viz.: First. All who had served honorably in
the enumerated wars of the United States, including those on either side in the ‘war
between the states.’ Second. All lawful descendants of persons who served honorably
in the enumerated wars or in the war of the Revolution. Third. ‘All persons who are
of good character and who understand the duties and obligations of citizenship under
a republican form of government.’ As we have said, according to the allegations of
the bill, this part of the Constitution, as practically administered and as intended to
be administered, let in all whites and kept out a large part, if not all, of the blacks,
and those who were let in retained their right to vote after 1903 . . .
Id. at 482-83.
53 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 115; 193 U.S. 146 (1904). R
54 189 U.S. at 488.
55 193 U.S. at 164.
56 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 116. R
57 Id.
58 Id. at 97 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
59 Id. (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)); see also Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
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cases are illustrative of the Court’s knowing and active protection of white
political minorities in the South at the expense of blacks, whether actual
majorities or minorities.
As explained in following sections, today the Court continues to protect
the interests of whites even when black Americans manage to gain political
power and attempt to exercise that power. Courts consistently support efforts
to deny black political will if it conflicts with the interests of conservative
white Americans. Derrick Bell has long argued that black Americans only
profit from political participation when their interests converge with those of
whites.60 But “when no such fortuitous arrangements are possible, blacks
have found that political participation becomes quite difficult.”61
B. Persistence of Black Disenfranchisement:
The 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections
Despite a constitutional amendment and congressional legislation,
black disenfranchisement continues. It is a national problem, not simply a
state one. This section discusses the response of courts and other govern-
mental entities to alleged claims of voter disenfranchisement and suppres-
sion targeting black and, in some cases, other non-white voters. It focuses
first on the 2000 presidential election and the role that the former confeder-
ate state, Florida, played in securing the election of the more conservative
presidential candidate. Then this section looks more broadly at voter disen-
franchisement during the 2004 elections in support of my contention that
suppression of the black vote is not a regional, but a persistent national
phenomenon.
1. The 2000 Presidential Election: The Case of Florida
Chin and Wagner list Florida as one of the states where black Ameri-
cans were politically numerous in the nineteenth century but effectively dis-
enfranchised. While the authors’ analysis stops in the early twentieth
century, Florida never ceased its efforts to disenfranchise black voters. In
1989 the federal district court judge in Bradford County NAACP v. City of
Starke wrote, “[t]he State of Florida has a long and well documented his-
tory of discrimination against black individuals.”62  A continuation of this
conduct during the 2000 presidential election was unsurprising.
60 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
61 DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 472 (5th ed. 2004).  Bell contin-
ues: “[B]lacks, while citizens, are always subject to ‘democratic domination’; their views,
aspirations, even basic political rights subject to the prevailing belief that America, and every
part of it, must be controlled by whites.” Id.
62 712 F. Supp. 1523, 1537 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
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The United States Commission on Civil Rights’s investigation of voting
irregularities in Florida during that election found that those precincts and
counties with the highest percentage of black voters had the highest number
of spoiled ballots.63 Less than one percent of ballot spoilage was attributed to
lack of education or other voter deficiencies.64 The Commission concluded
that “the disenfranchisement of Florida’s voters fell most harshly on the
shoulders of black voters.”65
Witness testimony supports the Commission’s conclusions about the
scope of black disenfranchisement.66 After hearing all the evidence, the
Commission concluded that the voting irregularities violated Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.67 It called on the U.S. Attorney General to “be-
gin the litigation process to determine liability under the [Voting Rights
63 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/
main.htm.  The Commission reported: “Nine of the 10 counties with the highest percentage of
African American voters had spoilage rates above the Florida average.  Of the 10 counties with
the highest percentage of white voters, only two counties had spoilage rates above the state
average . . . . Where precinct data were available, the data show that 83 of the 100 precincts
with the highest numbers of spoiled ballots are black-majority precincts.” Id. at xiii.  Accord-
ing to the Commission these voting irregularities resulted from:
(1) a general failure of leadership from those with responsibility for ensuring elec-
tions are properly planned and executed; (2) inadequate resources for voter educa-
tion, training of poll workers, and for Election Day trouble-shooting and problem
solving; (3) inferior voting equipment and/or ballot design; (4) failure to anticipate
and account for the expected high volumes of voters, including inexperienced voters;
(5) a poorly designed and even more poorly executed purge system; and (6) a re-
source allocation system that often left poorer counties, which often were counties
with the highest percentage of black voters, adversely affected.
Id. at xvii.
64 Id. at xii. The Executive Summary reads:
Statistical analysis shows that the disparity in ballot spoilage rates—i.e., ballots cast
but not counted—between black and nonblack voters is not the result of education or
literacy differences. This conclusion is supported by Governor Jeb Bush’s Select
Task Force on Election Procedures, Standards and Technology, which found that
error rates stemming from uneducated, uninformed, or disinterested voters account
for less than 1 percent of the problems . . . Approximately 11 percent of Florida
voters were African American; however, African Americans cast about 54 percent of
the 180,000 spoiled ballots in Florida during the November 2000 election based on
estimates derived from county-level data. These statewide estimates were corrobo-
rated by the results in several counties based on actual precinct data.
Id.
65 Id. More specifically, the Commission noted that “black voters were nearly 10 times
more likely than nonblack voters to have their ballots rejected. . . . [A]pproximately 14.4
percent of Florida’s black voters cast ballots that were rejected . . . compare[d] with approxi-
mately 1.6 percent of nonblack Florida voters . . . .” Id.
66 Id. at xiii (“The magnitude of the disenfranchisement, including the disparity between
black and nonblack voters, is supported by the testimony of witnesses at the Commission’s
hearings. These witnesses include local election officials, poll workers, ordinary voters, and
activists.”).
67 Id. (citing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (2000)).
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Act] and appropriate remedies.”68 The Commission also “recommend[ed]
that Florida retain knowledgeable experts to undertake a formal study to
ascertain the reason for the racial disparities in vote rejection rates between
white voters and persons of color. . . . [and] adopt and publicize procedures
to eliminate this disparity.”69 Florida took no action, perhaps relying instead
on an earlier report of a task force created by Governor Jeb Bush, brother of
the presidential candidate, to examine the 2000 election. That report made
no mention whatsoever of the impact of race on vote rejection rates.70
Florida’s electoral votes were crucial to the outcome of the 2000 presi-
dential race. Litigation over the vote count was waged at both the state and
federal level.71 In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court, mindful of Florida’s
long history of black disenfranchisement, intervened to stop the recount of
votes in Florida amid claims of black disenfranchised voters.72 The some-
what incoherent 5-4 ruling effectively delivered the state’s twenty-five elec-
toral votes to the Republican candidate, George W. Bush.73 These votes
allowed him to garner 271 electoral votes, one more than needed to defeat
Democratic candidate Albert Gore.74 The vast majority of black voters in
Florida and the nation had supported Gore.75
68 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 63, at xiii.  In 2002, the Commission further R
reported: “The Justice Department investigated some of the abuses involving access to the
polls by individuals with limited English proficiency and individuals with disabilities. How-
ever, other irregularities have not been investigated by the department.” U.S. COMM’N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING RIGHTS IN FLORIDA 2002: BRIEFING SUMMARY 1 (2002), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/VotingRightsFla02CRbrief.pdf; see
also Roger Roy, Orange Is Justice’s 3rd Target: Threat of Lawsuit over Vote Criticized as
“Whitewash,” ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 24, 2002, at A1 (noting that of the investigations and
suits brought by the Department of Justice after the 2000 election, “none of the imminent
federal suits in Florida deal with complaints from black voters”).  The Government Accounta-
bility Office also published a report on the Justice Department’s investigations. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE,  DOJ ACTIVITIES TO ADDRESS PAST ELECTION-RELATED VOTING
IRREGULARITIES 71, 77 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041041r.pdf (de-
tailing the investigations generated by complaints about the conduct of the 2000 elections in
Florida and other states).
69 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 63, at xiii-xiv. R
70 See REVITALIZING DEMOCRACY IN FLORIDA: THE GOVERNOR’S SELECT TASK FORCE ON
ELECTION PROCEDURES, STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (2001), available at http://www.collins
center.org/usr_doc/Election%20Report.pdf; see also U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 63, at 14 (describing the settlement of a lawsuit brought by the NAACP and others against R
Florida state and local election officials and agencies).
71 For a discussion of this litigation, see generally ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., BUSH V.
GORE: THE FIGHT FOR FLORIDA’S VOTE (2001); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME
COURT (CASS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD A. EPSTEIN eds., 2001).
72 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
73 See BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY xiii-xiv (E.J. DIONNE,
JR. & WILLIAM KRISTOL eds., 2001).
74 Dionne & Kristol, Introduction to BUSH V. GORE, supra note 73, at 1. R
75 See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTI-
TUTION, AND THE COURTS 78 (2001) (noting that in Florida “exit poll data show[ed] blacks
favor[ed] Gore by a margin of 93 percent to 7 percent”); Gerald M. Pomper, The 2000 Presi-
dential Election: Why Gore Lost, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 201, 206 (2001) (noting the 48 percent
“ ‘racial gap’ between blacks’ support for Gore and whites’ support for Bush” and that “Afri-
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The effect of the Court’s action in Bush v. Gore and the early twentieth-
century Giles cases was the same: preservation of a status quo that favored
the actions of “democratically” elected state officials who were protecting
white conservative political interests. The Supreme Court’s belief in Bush v.
Gore that intervention was necessary to save the presidential election from
devolving into turmoil ignited by claims of black disenfranchisement ig-
nored the clear constitutional path to be taken in such cases.76 So instead of
passively allowing black disenfranchisement as it did in the Giles cases, the
Court in Bush v. Gore took a more active role in fostering black
disenfranchisement.
The conventional legal response to election fraud and irregularities usu-
ally is prospective, not immediate.77 Bush v. Gore is unique only in this one
respect: It provided immediate relief, but to racially conservative whites, not
blacks. Relief for black disenfranchisement, if it comes at all, comes too late
to protect the vote in the challenged election. In other words, cheaters win,
provided their actions advance the interests of the white conservative politi-
cal majority. As I discuss in the next section, the circumstances of the 2004
presidential election seem to confirm this point.
2. The 2004 Presidential Election
In a series of articles written in 2004, New York Times columnist Bob
Herbert bemoans attempts by the Republican Party to suppress the black
vote leading up to and during the 2004 presidential election.78 In one of these
can American support for the Republican candidate was lower than in any election since the
1960s”).
76 See Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore?, 34 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 1, 7-9 (2002) (describing the federal laws and constitutional provisions mandating that the
matter be resolved by Congress had the Court not stopped the recount process).
77 See Hugh M. Lee, An Analysis of State and Federal Remedies for Election Fraud:
Learning from Florida’s Presidential Election Debacle, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 159 (2001) (dis-
cussing inadequacies of state election fraud remedies); Note, Elections: Developments in the
Law: VI. Postelection Remedies, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1299 & n.3 (1975) (noting that
despite the availability of various remedies, “[h]istorically, political considerations have
caused prosecuting attorneys to ignore most election violations”). But see Steven F. Huefner,
Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 265, 305-10 (2007) (describing the in-
creased likelihood of immediate intervention in elections due to recent reforms in election
law).
78 See Bob Herbert, A Chill in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2004, at A19 (describing
additional efforts to suppress the black vote in Florida); Bob Herbert, Days of Shame, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A25 (describing Republican efforts to suppress the black vote in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin); Bob Herbert, For Bush, Bad News Is
Bad News, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at A21 (Republican Party trying to “intimidate” Demo-
cratic voters in key states like Ohio and Florida); Bob Herbert, Protect the Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2004, at A23; Bob Herbert, Sacrifice and Sabotage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at A27
(describing a study by two University of Miami professors of “so-called vote errors in Miami-
Dade County” during the 2000 presidential election); Bob Herbert, Suppress the Vote?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at A15 (describing Florida state police intimidation of elderly black
voters in their homes); Bob Herbert, Voting While Black, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at A23
(describing state actors’ involvement in black voter suppression in Florida).
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articles, he mentions a study by the People for the American Way (“PFAW”)
and the NAACP entitled The Long Shadow of Jim Crow.79 The PFAW-
NAACP study cites a few examples of recent voter suppression or disen-
franchisement efforts targeting black Americans during the 2004 presidential
election year. These efforts were not confined to the former confederate
states, and black voters, although the primary targets, were not the only ra-
cial minority group affected.80 Further, while conceding that voter suppres-
sion is not confined to one political party, the study documents “recent
strategies” used by the Republican Party to suppress the black vote across
the country.81
Just as the Democratic-controlled southern states of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century acted with the tacit approval of the nation’s white
racial conservative majority to disenfranchise black adult males,82 today
states with sizeable black minorities use “legal” mechanisms like felony
disenfranchisement laws to dilute the black vote,83 along with illegal meth-
79 Herbert, Protect the Vote, supra note 78. R
80 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION & NAACP, THE LONG SHADOW OF JIM
CROW: VOTER INTIMIDATION AND SUPPRESSION IN AMERICA TODAY (2004), available at http://
www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oId=16368. The study cites reported instances of
voter suppression or intimidation in Detroit, Michigan; Kentucky; Florida; Texas; Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Louisiana; and South Carolina. Id.  In addition, the study identifies reports of
similar activity targeting Hispanic and Native American voters. Id.
81 Id. These strategies included distributing misleading voter information in black commu-
nities, “implement[ing] . . . a ‘potential felon’ purge list” to remove black voters from the
rolls, requiring voters to provide photo identification when not required by state law, using
“armed, plainclothes officers . . . to question elderly black voters in their homes,” planning the
use of “vote challengers” in heavily black precincts, and trying to prevent qualified black
college students from a majority black college from voting in the county where the school was
located. Id. According to the study, Republican-initiated voter suppression efforts targeting
black Americans date back to 1981. Id.
82 Many southern states excluded otherwise qualified black voters from participating in
political party primary elections. In most instances, the primary election was the key race since
there was no meaningful two-party system in these states. The history of the all-white primary
in Texas is particularly instructive. When the all-white primary was challenged, the Supreme
Court ruled on Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection grounds that states could not directly
exclude black voters. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). The Texas legislature, respond-
ing to Herndon, attempted to maintain the exclusion by giving the Democratic Party power to
determine who could participate in its party primary election. The Texas Supreme Court up-
held this law, characterizing the party as a “voluntary association,” which had the right to
determine its membership and exclude otherwise qualified voters from participating based
solely on race. Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 534 (1934). In a series of decisions, the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled both for and against Texas’ versions of the all-white primary. Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (holding all-white primary authorized by state Democratic Execu-
tive Committee unconstitutional because the Executive Committee was a state creation);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (holding all-white primary authorized by Democratic
Party state convention constitutional); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (finally strik-
ing down Texas’s all-white primary relying on the Fifteenth Amendment).
83 See Chin, supra note 46, at 305 (“Many felon voting bans were passed in the late 1860s R
and 1870s, when implementation of the Fifteenth Amendment and its extension of voting
rights to African-Americans were ardently contested.” (quoting Angela Behrens et al., Ballot
Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disen-
franchisement in the United States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 559 (2003))); Christo-
pher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon
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ods like those discovered in Florida by the Civil Rights Commission to deny
blacks equal and meaningful access to the political decision-making process.
Thus, the disenfranchising process described by Chin and Wagner continues
today, although in slightly different forms. But, as I point out in the next
section, even when black voters are able to exercise political power, the
Court frustrates them when their interests threaten the interests of white ra-
cial conservatives.
C. Recognition and Protection of Black Political Will
Chin and Wagner also assume that if black citizens had not been disen-
franchised they would have been able to realize their political objectives on
a local and state level and to influence policies on a national level through
their representatives in the Congress. But even assuming blacks had been
able to influence public policy, there is no assurance that their decisions
would have withstood judicial scrutiny if their preferred policy worked
against the interest of hostile whites. Modern cases indicate that courts re-
main unwilling to enforce the political will of enfranchised black majorities
or pluralities when white racial conservative interests might be adversely
affected.
Although a detailed discussion of recent Supreme Court decisions on
voting and the electoral process is beyond the scope of this Article, the
Court’s history on racial gerrymandering deserves brief mention. Many
scholars argue that the contemporary cases of Shaw v. Reno,84 Croson, and
Wygant, have undermined the civil rights of black Americans. Modern racial
gerrymandering cases date back to Gomillion v. Lightfoot, in which the
Court found that a redistricting plan developed by the Alabama State Legis-
lature substantially changed the geographic boundaries of Tuskegee to ex-
clude all but four or five blacks and no whites.85 The Supreme Court, in
reversing the lower court’s denial of declaratory and injunctive relief, held
that the petitioner’s allegations, if proven true, meant that the state legislature
had deprived black citizens of the municipal franchise and the rights that
come with city residency.86
In later cases, the Court initially distinguished Gomillion-like efforts
that diluted the black vote from redistricting plans that protected or enhanced
black voting strength through the creation of de facto minority-majority dis-
tricts when these plans were challenged unsuccessfully by whites using the
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 780 (2002) (noting “1.8
million of the 4.7 million felons and ex-felons currently barred from voting are African Ameri-
cans . . . [and that] [b]ecause African Americans are overwhelmingly Democratic Party vot-
ers, felon disenfranchisement erodes the Democratic voting base by reducing the number of
eligible African American voters”) (internal citations omitted).
84 509 U.S. 630, 642-43 (1993) (striking down a minority-majority district reapportion-
ment plan).
85 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
86 Id. at 347.
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.87 But in Shaw v. Reno,
the Court refused to draw a distinction between efforts to dilute and efforts
to protect black citizens’ rights to participate in the political process on equal
footing with white citizens.
The Court in Shaw applied strict scrutiny and concluded that the state
redistricting plan that had created one black minority-majority district was
“so irrational on its face that it [could] be understood only as an effort to
segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race.”88 In so
doing, the Court ignored evidence that white voters, especially in the South,
tend not to support black candidates — making it difficult for black candi-
dates to get elected in districts where blacks do not constitute a substantial
majority of the registered voters.89
In a series of increasingly confusing cases, the Supreme Court tried to
explain when racial majority-minority districts could survive a strict scrutiny
review.90 The racial gerrymandering cases raise the larger question about the
inherent fairness of any kind of gerrymandering, but discussion of this topic
is also beyond the scope of this article. I simply use Shaw as an example of
the Court’s willful blindness to the long-term hostility of many white racial
conservatives to the exercise of political power by black citizens. The next
section examines this point in more detail.
1. State and Local Government Attempts to Remedy Race
Discrimination
Chin and Wagner note that the modern Court has acknowledged the
effects of past race-based discrimination on the “opportunities enjoyed by
87 See, e.g., United Jewish Org., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (upholding the crea-
tion of a Jewish minority-majority district); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (up-
holding the creation of a black minority-majority district); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52
(1964) (upholding creation of several nonwhite majority districts). But see, Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (finding Equal Protection violation where minority-majority
district is created in area with no concentration of minority voters); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735 (1973) (holding district that excludes a racial group of its pre-existing municipal
franchise violates the Equal Protection Clause).
88 509 U.S. at 658.  In a later case, Miller v. Johnson, the Court, applying strict scrutiny,
struck down a state redistricting plan that resulted in the creation of minority-majority districts
on the basis that the plan was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est.  515 U.S. 900 (1995).
89 See Nicholas A. Valentino & David O. Sears, Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race
and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South, 49 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 672, 674 (2005)
(noting that political parties are divided “quite decisively along racial lines . . . [and that]
Republicans are almost all white, and blacks are the dominant core of the Southern Democratic
Party”).
90 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003);
Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000); Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Lawyer
v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v. Vera,
517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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minority groups in our society.”91 Yet the same Court often adopts an ahis-
torical perspective when reviewing state and local actions aimed at remedy-
ing the consequences of long-term black disenfranchisement or vote
dilution. In this section, I use Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,92 in-
volving a race-based teacher lay-off plan, and City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson,93 involving a municipal minority set-aside program, to demonstrate
the falsity of the Court’s claim that it traditionally defers to the decisions of
democratic majorities.
Both cases involve local decisions made pursuant to a democratic pro-
cess offering remedial efforts on behalf of black Americans. In both cases,
the Court struck down the programs created by those local decisions. The
cases show that the Court invokes counter-majoritarian concerns to protect
the interests of racially conservative whites, whether majorities or
minorities.
Chin and Wagner cite to the plurality opinion in Croson as acknowledg-
ing that “‘past discrimination’ affected ‘the opportunities enjoyed by minor-
ity groups in our society,’” 94 but they fail to acknowledge that the Croson
decision effectively undermined remedial policies enacted by a black major-
ity in Richmond. Later Supreme Court and lower federal court cases limiting
affirmative action efforts cite Croson approvingly. As John Nowak writes,
there was a brief period during the 1960s and early 1970s when the Court
was more amenable to protecting racial minorities, but “since the late 1980s
. . . [it] seems to have turned against racial minorities, as it has narrowed
earlier rulings concerning the Equal Protection Clause and restricted the ef-
forts of legislatures to help racial minorities.”95 Just as in the past, whenever
black citizens start to exercise their political power to bring about change,
the Court intervenes to thwart their efforts, often turning a blind eye to past
inequalities.
Chin and Wagner cite Missouri v. Jenkins as an example of the Court’s
refusal to link the current condition of many black public school students to
discriminatory policies made possible due to black voter disenfranchise-
91 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 7 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 R
U.S. 265, 293 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
92 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
93 488 U.S. 469 (1989). See Stephen M. Rich, Ruling by Numbers: Political Restructuring
and the Reconsideration of Democratic Commitments After Romer v. Evans, 109 YALE L.J.
587, 605 n.113 (1999); Constitutional Scholars’ Statement on Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711, 1712 (1989) (signatories included constitu-
tional law notables Paul Brest, Yale Kamisar, John Hart Ely, Kenneth L. Karst, Frank I.
Michelman, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein, Laurence H. Tribe, Norman Dorsen, and
Jesse Choper trying to put a positive spin on the Court’s decision).
94 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 71.
95 John E. Nowak, Brown v. Board of Education After Forty Years: Confronting the Prom-
ise: The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 345, 349 (1995).
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ment.96 In Jenkins, a federal district judge in a long-standing school desegre-
gation lawsuit refused to consider low performance on standardized tests by
black students in formerly segregated schools as “vestiges of a segregated
system [where] ‘numerous factors beyond the control of [the state] affect
minority achievement,’” 97 and released the school district from further court
supervision. In Jenkins, remedial efforts were the result of legal action, so
arguably the district court was forcing the local government to implement
certain policies that benefited black school-age children. The case involved
no democratically conceived policy decision warranting judicial deference.
But this was not the case in Wygant,98 in which blacks, although a minority
in their community, used their political power to get the local school to
adopt a plan to more fully integrate its teaching staff.
The plan challenged and ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court
in Wygant involved a voluntary program adopted as part of a collective bar-
gaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education and the Jackson
Education Association, a unit of the Michigan Education Association.  The
Sixth Circuit described this agreement as an “affirmative action layoff sys-
tem, subjected to collective bargaining safeguards.”99 All the parties agreed
that the Board of Education employed no black teachers before 1954.100
Thus, the black teachers were relatively new hires with less seniority than
most of their white counterparts.
A majority of the local, predominately white union membership and a
majority of the School Board approved the labor contract.101 When layoffs
appeared likely, the School Board refused to enforce the agreement, and the
union and two minority teachers who had been laid off sued.102 After pro-
96 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 78 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 R
(1995)).
97 Id.
98 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
99 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1984). The specific
provision read as follows:
[T]eachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no
time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the cur-
rent percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In no event
will the number given notice of possible layoff be greater than the number of posi-
tions to be eliminated.
Id. at 270.
 In response to several complaints by the Jackson NAACP, the Jackson Board of Education
in 1969 created an “ad hoc committee of teachers, school administrators and faculty union
representatives” to study how to remedy school segregation and minority faculty hiring
problems. Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law & ACLU as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Respondents at 7, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) R
(No. 84-1340). The committee’s recommendations, coupled with an additional NAACP com-
plaint and a racially-motivated explosion at a high school, prompted the School Board to cre-
ate the provision that was ultimately challenged. Id. at 9-10; 476 U.S. at 287-88 (White, J.,
concurring).
100 Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1156.
101 Id. at 1158.
102 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 271-72.
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tracted litigation in both the federal and state courts, the state circuit court
concluded that the School Board had breached its contract with the teachers
and ordered the Board to comply, which it did.103 As a result, ten white
teachers with more seniority than black teachers were laid off in two sepa-
rate academic years. The laid off teachers subsequently sued.104
In upholding the plan, the lower appellate court wrote that the “local
school board and its teacher bargaining representative [voluntarily] . . .
adopted a protective collective bargaining contract containing a provision as
to teachers in racial minority status. . . . to cure faculty racial imbalance and
as a matter of educational policy.”105 In other words, the challenged provi-
sion was the result of a transparent democratic process where whites were in
the overwhelming majority. The appellate court reasoned that limited and
narrowly tailored voluntary affirmative action programs are permissible
even where presumably innocent third parties share some of the burden of
“cur[ing] the effects of prior discrimination.”106 Therefore, a majority of
white union members could voluntarily choose to disadvantage themselves
to address black under-representation on the teaching staff.
Five members of the Supreme Court disagreed, striking down the layoff
provision.107  Justice Powell, writing for a three-justice plurality and alluding
only to some unspecified “racial tension in the community” and school
around the time the collective bargaining agreement was adopted,108 charac-
terized the School Board’s goal as remedying societal — as opposed to the
Board’s — past, race-based discrimination. Belatedly, the School Board ad-
mitted it had previously discriminated,109 but Justice Powell dismissed this
proffer of evidence.  He asserted that even if true, “the layoff provision was
not a legally appropriate means of achieving even a compelling purpose.”110
Justice Powell suggested a more demanding scrutiny is required when the
affirmative action efforts apply to existing employees as opposed to poten-
tial applicants.111
Justice Marshall, dissenting, acknowledged the inadequacy of the re-
cord before the Court while reciting evidence of the School Board’s past
103 Id.
104 Id. at 272. By the time the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, all but one of the
white teachers had been rehired, but all were seeking back pay. Philip Hager, Justices Accept
Minority Preference Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1985, § 1, at 10.
105 Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1157.
106 Id. “We believe that it is within the power and authority of the parties to this agreement
so to do, and that their action is in no respect in violation of the United States Constitution or
federal law.” Id. Nonetheless, as the majority of the Supreme Court noted, when teachers were
asked individually, “[n]inety-six percent of . . . [those] who responded . . . expressed a
preference for the straight seniority system” in the case of a layoff. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270
n.1.
107 Wygant, 476 U.S. 267.
108 Id. at 270.
109 Id. at 277-78.
110 Id. at 278.
111 See id. at 283.
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race-based discriminatory practices.112 He opined that “[t]he real irony of
the [plurality’s] argument urging mandatory, formal findings of discrimina-
tion lies in its complete disregard for a longstanding goal of civil rights re-
form[:] . . . integrating schools without taking every school system to
court.”113 Justice Stevens, also dissenting, added that even the meager record
before the Court did not contradict the School Board’s claim that its efforts
had a “completely sound educational purpose.”114
In Wygant, five conservative members of the Court seemed suspicious
of voluntary, although arguably politically coerced, efforts to remedy past
discrimination, even when adopted by whites through transparent and demo-
cratic processes.115 The Court also seemed oblivious to the reluctance of gov-
ernment actors who might have discriminated in the past to acknowledge
these acts, and perhaps open themselves to legal liability, when justifying
voluntary affirmative action efforts.116
The ruling in Wygant suggests judicial hostility toward black political
minorities who are able to persuade whites to voluntarily join them in enact-
ing policies to correct past racial wrongs. Thus, the outcome in Wygant is an
example of the ongoing harm to black Americans that Chin and Wagner
argue relates to their disenfranchisement in the late nineteenth century. Jus-
tice Stevens offered a possible explanation for the Court’s protection of
whites in these situations. Describing the real harm whites fear in employ-
ment discrimination cases, he wrote, “when an employer simply agrees to
recruit minority job applicants more actively, white applicants suffer the
‘nebulous’ harm of facing increased competition and the diminished likeli-
hood of eventually being hired.”117 Fear of competition with blacks and di-
minished economic opportunities may explain the continued resistance to
racial integration not only in the nation’s public schools, but also in other
employment contexts.
Unlike in Wygant, where the remedial racial minority preference policy
was put in force by a white-dominated local government entity, in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the minority set-aside program was enacted by
a black majority city council.118 Here too a majority of the Court, relying
112 Id. at 297-300 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 305.  Marshall continued: “Testimony of both Union and school officials illus-
trates that the Board’s obligation to integrate its faculty could not have been fulfilled meaning-
fully as long as layoffs continued to eliminate the last hired.” Id. at 307.
114 Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 Granted, some scholars might quibble with my characterization of unions as demo-
cratic bodies given the statutory protections granted union members to challenge union deci-
sions. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2000) (proscribing unfair labor practices by unions).
I use the phrase “democratic processes” to describe a degree of representativeness that is a
cornerstone of American democracy.
116 For a discussion of the point in the context of the Regents of University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 912 (1978), litigation, see JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE
BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 81-82, 210-11 (1979).
117 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 792 n.31 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989).
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heavily on its earlier decision in Wygant, found the policy unlawful. Rich-
mond, the capital of Confederacy, had a long and well documented history
of discrimination targeting blacks.119 As recently as the early 1970s, the
Court struck down the city’s attempt to annex a part of a predominately
white portion of the adjacent county to offset the city’s growing black popu-
lation, saying that the plan was “infected by the impermissible purpose of
denying the right to vote based on race through perpetuating white majority
power to exclude Negroes from office.”120
But in years immediately preceding Croson, there had been signs of
change and racial cooperation in city government.121 By the late 1970s,
blacks constituted approximately fifty percent of the city’s population122
and occupied five seats on the nine-person Richmond City Council.123
However, black-owned or black-controlled businesses were awarded
only 0.67 percent of general city construction contracts.124 Mindful of
the federal set-aside provision upheld by the Supreme Court in Fulli-
love v. Klutznick,125 the City Council proposed a short-term remedial
measure, the Minority Business Utilization Plan.126 The plan required
prime contractors with the city to set aside thirty percent of the dollar
amount of any city construction contract for minority subcontractors.127
119 Id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting). There is a long history dating back to the colonial
era of efforts, often reinforced by law, to discourage blacks from engaging in profitable com-
mercial enterprises. For a discussion of this history, see Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimina-
tion in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1260-62 (1991).
120 Croson, 488 U.S. at 544 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Richmond v. United States,
422 U.S. 358, 373 (1975)).
121 Croson, 488 U.S. at 554-55.
122 Id. at 553.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 534.
125 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
126 The plan was to be in effect for no more than five years.  Croson, 488 U.S. at 478.
The plan was no longer in force by the time the case was argued before the Court in 1988. Id.
at 478.
127 Id. Congress, based on extensive legislative findings in the 1970s about the lingering
effects of these discriminatory laws and practices, enacted the Public Works Employment Act
of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6701 et seq. (2000)). This
Act contained a provision that required state and local governments to set aside ten percent of
their federal grants to procure services or supplies for businesses owned or controlled by iden-
tified racial minority groups. Croson, 488 U.S. at 530-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The City Council broadly defined minority-owned business to include any business owned
and controlled by “citizens . . . who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Es-
kimos, or Aleuts.” Id. at 478 (plurality opinion). Given the city’s racial history, the category of
beneficiaries was overbroad and thus the Court’s antagonism is somewhat understandable. But
as Justice Marshall points out, there was ample support for the fact that blacks had been ex-
cluded in the past; thus, the majority should have preserved the preference for black entrepre-
neurs and not have struck down the entire provision. Id. at 550 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The City Council similarly said that the plan was designed to remedy past discrimination
that favored white businesses and to prevent the city’s present spending decisions from “rein-
forcing and perpetuating the exclusionary effects of past discrimination.” Id. at 537.
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The set-aside provision applied to any minority business in the United
States.128
The Richmond City Council held public hearings before enacting the
plan.  One white council member voted for the plan, another abstained, and
the two remaining white council members voted against the measure.  All
five of the black council members supported the plan.129
When the plan was challenged in Croson, a divided Supreme Court
with a splintered majority struck it down. Justifying the first application of
strict scrutiny review to an allegedly benign racial classification,130 Justice
O’Connor, writing for a plurality, invoked Footnote 4 of Carolene Products
to hold that strict scrutiny was appropriate in this case because of the Court’s
role to protect “discrete and insular minorities.”131 This constituted an inap-
propriate application of Footnote 4 since the plan represented the will of a
black majority government and populace. As Chin and Wagner point out,
traditionally the Court invokes Footnote 4 to protect racial minorities, and
other outsiders, from the tyranny of white political majorities.132
Justice O’Connor seemed to have little concern for the integrity of the
transparent democratic process that produced the measure or the counter-
majoritarian tensions inherent in the Court’s action. Instead, she expressed
concern that the city presented no evidence that it or its prime contractors
had discriminated based on race in the awarding of contracts. She accepted
unquestioningly the argument that any racial disparity was due to the ab-
sence of blacks in the industry and not the result of past discrimination by
the city.133 Justice Marshall, in a vigorous dissent, charged Justice O’Connor
with constructing an ahistorical narrative that disrespected findings of a city
128 Id. at 477 (plurality opinion). This provision was designed to remedy the widespread
disparities throughout industry catalogued by Congress six years earlier, and not simply dis-
crimination against minority contractors in Richmond. Id.
129 Id. at 555 (Marshall, J., dissenting). At public hearings on the merits of the plan, five
people spoke in opposition and two in favor. Id. at 479 (plurality opinion). The City Council
heard testimony that minorities were almost non-existent in the area’s major construction trade
associations, and that in the past, minorities had been excluded from the local construction
industry. Id. The virtually all-white contractors’ associations in Richmond opposed the mea-
sure. Id. at 480. But no witness denied that race discrimination had been widespread in the
city’s construction industry. Id. at 534-35. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing the federal district
court’s opinion, Civ. Action No. 84-0021 (E.D. Va., Dec. 3, 1984)). Nor was there any direct
evidence during the hearing or the ensuing litigation that the measure was the result of imper-
missible city council motives. Id. at 546, 537.
130 Id. at 551 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 495 (“If one aspect of the judiciary’s role under the Equal Protection Clause is to
protect ‘discrete and insular minorities’ from majoritarian prejudice or indifference . . . some
maintain that these concerns are not implicated when the ‘white majority’ places burdens upon
itself . . . .”) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
132 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 71. R
133 Croson, 488 U.S. at 480.  Justice O’Connor wrote: “To a large extent, the set-aside of
subcontracting dollars seems to rest on the unsupported assumption that white prime contrac-
tors simply will not hire minority firms . . . . ‘[T]here is no finding—and we decline to
assume—that male Caucasian contractors will award contracts only to other male Cauca-
sians.’” Id. at 502 (citing Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City & County of San Francisco,
813 F.2d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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council whose members “have spent long years witnessing multifarious acts
of discrimination, including, but not limited to, the deliberate diminution of
black residents’ voting rights, resistance to school desegregation, and pub-
licly sanctioned housing discrimination.”134
In yet another ironic reading of history, Justice O’Connor invoked the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in support of her claim that their
ratification dramatically changed what states and local governments could
do in matters of race; thus, a city could not, for example, legislate to elimi-
nate societal discrimination.135 In response to Marshall’s dissent, she wrote
that “[Section] 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment stemmed from a distrust of
state legislative enactments based on race . . . .”136 Her willingness to re-
move both the amendment and the case from their historical context — the
need to protect politically powerless black Americans from racially tinged
laws enacted by hostile white majorities, and the long-term consequences of
Richmond’s racial history — is breathtaking.137
The lack of traditional judicial deference to decisions by elected bodies
in Justice O’Connor’s opinion was quite clear. After noting that blacks con-
stituted fifty percent of Richmond’s population and a bare majority of the
city council, she wrote, “[t]he concern that a political majority will more
easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assump-
tions or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the applica-
tion of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case.”138 She implied that the bare
black political majority on the Richmond City Council was trying to get
undeserved spoils of power.139 To her, and three other justices, a fifty percent
134 Id. at 529, 544 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor conceded that Richmond’s
long history of both public and private discrimination “contributed to a lack of opportunities
for black entrepreneurs,” but she concluded that this history alone is insufficient to justify the
set-aside provision. Id. at 499 (plurality opinion). She even speculated that “[b]lacks may be
disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction.” Id. at 503. Of course, if
there were no jobs available to blacks, one would not expect them to engage in a futile
exercise.
135 Id. at 490-92.
136 Id. at 491.
137 Justice Marshall countered: “The fact is that Congress’ concern in passing the Recon-
struction Amendments, and particularly their congressional authorization provisions, was that
States would not adequately respond to racial violence or discrimination against newly freed
slaves. To interpret any aspect of these Amendments as proscribing state remedial responses to
these very problems turns the Amendments on their heads.” Id. at 559. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
138 Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96. Reginald Oh writes that Justice O’Connor in essence
accused the City Council of “acting out of pure racial politics, [and] . . . out of a desire to
harm white interests in order to benefit black interests.” Reginald C. Oh, Mapping a Material-
ist LatCrit Discourse on Racism, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 243, 249 (2005).
139 The Croson case reached the Court twice.  In the first case the Court vacated the judg-
ment for the City and remanded it in light of a recent decision, Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). J.A. Croson Co. v. Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).  Upon
rehearing, the appellate court in a split decision struck down the plan. See J.A. Croson Co. v.
Richmond (Croson II), 822 F.2d 1335, 1359 (4th Cir. 1987). Justice O’Connor writes that the
lower appellate court concluded that the statistical evidence presented to the city council “had
little or no probative value in establishing prior discrimination in the relevant market, and
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black presence in a city, and a bare majority on the city council translated
into a black majority capable of trampling the rights of Richmond’s white
citizens who were neither an insular minority nor a politically powerless
group.
Justice Scalia was more direct. In a concurring opinion he wrote:
“[B]lacks have often been on the receiving end of the [racial] injustice.
Where injustice is the game, however, turnabout is not fair play.”140
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, opined that the set-aside provi-
sion was so broad it “seem[ed] acceptable to assume that every white con-
tractor covered by the ordinance shares in that guilt.”141 It never occurred to
him that all white contractors, whether they actually discriminated or not, are
beneficiaries of past and present policies or practices that discourage black
businesses. Unlike other successful challenges to affirmative action plans,
the program struck down in Croson did not trample the existing rights of
majority business owners,142 unless one cynically argues that majority busi-
ness owners’ whiteness confers on them a property interest that trumps black
interests or expectations.143 More importantly, the plan was enacted pursuant
to a democratic process where blacks and whites had almost equal political
power.
The outcome in Croson suggests the Court’s unwillingness to invoke
the counter-majoritarian principle when considering laws and policies en-
acted by or on behalf of black majorities or pluralities. One possible expla-
nation is that the minority model is designed not to truly reflect the
pluralistic democracy in which we live but to preserve white political domi-
actually suggested ‘more of a political than a remedial basis for the racial preference.’” 488
U.S. at 485 (citing Croson II, 822 F.2d at 1359).
140 Croson, 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia characterized racial
preferences as attempts to “even the score.” Id. at 528.  Justice Marshall retorted that “[t]he
sole . . . circumstance which the majority cites [to justify invoking strict scrutiny] . . . is the
fact that blacks in Richmond are a ‘dominant racial grou[p]” . . . . While I agree that the
numerical and political supremacy of a given racial group is a factor bearing upon the level of
scrutiny to be applied, this Court has never held that numerical inferiority, standing alone,
makes a racial group ‘suspect’ and thus entitled to strict scrutiny review.” Id. at 553 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun added “History is irrefutable, even though one might sympa-
thize with those who—though possibly innocent in themselves—benefit from the wrongs of
past decades.” Id. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142 Justice Marshall wrote: “[L]ike the federal provision [in Fullilove], Richmond’s does
not interfere with any vested right of a contractor to a particular contract; instead it operates
entirely prospectively.  Richmond’s initiative affects only future economic arrangements and
imposes only a diffuse burden on nonminority competitors.” Id. at 549 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
See also Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the
Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 213
(1992) (arguing against consent decrees that undermine the subsequent property interests of
incumbent employees in their jobs). Robert Suggs writes that the Court, by its “focus on past
discrimination to the exclusion of current discrimination[,] created the false impression that
the beneficiaries of business set-asides occupy a position analogous to the beneficiaries of
employment hiring goals.” Suggs, supra note 119, at 1310. R
143 See generally Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
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nance. Chin and Wagner argue that the Court’s concern about counter-
majoritarian rulings unfairly limits its willingness to protect black voters
from disenfranchisement and voter suppression efforts. Yet the Court’s deci-
sions in Wygant and Croson seem inconsistent with its stated concern for the
democratic majority. These two decisions are examples of the Court’s pro-
tective stance toward whites, whether they are a majority or minority, who
are disadvantaged or may be disadvantaged in the future by voluntary reme-
dial efforts that favor blacks or other racial minorities. In this sense, Wygant
and Croson suggest the continuing concern with protecting white political
rights without regard to whether whites are majorities or minorities.
The foregoing discussion highlights the difficulty black citizens face
when they seek to use the political process to remedy the consequences of
past disenfranchisement and voter suppression. The next section discusses
one of the most pressing long-term consequences of black disenfranchise-
ment: educational inequality. Increasingly, access to education is essential to
one’s ability to fully exercise politically-related citizenship rights. Since edu-
cation is not a constitutionally protected right, black Americans continue to
be disadvantaged by past and present policies that limit their ability to obtain
educational opportunities commensurate with most white Americans.
2. Educational Equality in Public Education: A Case Study of
Restrictions on Rights to Work and Property
Chin and Wagner argue that unless a claimant can establish intent to
discriminate based on race, the Court is unwilling to protect blacks from
policy decisions by democratic white majorities in an area like education.144
The authors remind us that during the Jim Crow era disenfranchised blacks
were denied the political power to challenge how money was spent on non-
constitutional rights like education,145 but this conclusion assumes that
blacks would consistently vote as a bloc and would agree on things like
educational policy. The historical record is less clear. While black Ameri-
cans in the southern states generally favored universal public education,
there was some internal disagreement over policy details.146 As the contem-
porary debate within the black community about school vouchers suggests,
black Americans are not a monolithic voting bloc.147
144 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 15.
145 Id. at 4.
146 For example, blacks comprised 76 of the 124 delegates at the 1868 South Carolina state
constitutional convention and were a clear majority. After lengthy discussions of education,
the convention voted for a constitutional right to free public education, but some black dele-
gates disagreed about whether participation in the public education system should be compul-
sory or voluntary. Similarly, there was some minor disagreement among the black delegates
about implementing a literacy requirement for voting. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUC-
TION IN AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 389, 396-98 (1935).
147 While poor black Americans in urban areas tend to support school voucher plans,
“black advocacy groups like the NAACP still oppose vouchers, as do older African Americans
— who are more likely to vote . . . [thus] [s]upport for school choice among African Ameri-
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Nevertheless, Chin and Wagner argue persuasively that contemporary
public education issues reflect the harmful consequences of educational poli-
cies of more than a century earlier that grew out of attempts to thwart the
political influence of black state majorities and pluralities.148 The contempo-
rary Court exacerbates this harm when it invokes counter-majoritarian con-
cerns as an “inherent limit on minority power in a democracy” 149 in race
discrimination cases. They argue that this practice, which started in reaction
to Brown v. Board of Education, “naturally and reasonably led to the con-
clusion that segregation and Jim Crow was a partial and limited cause of the
African American disadvantage.”150 As a result, the full historical record was
obscured.
In this section, I contend that Chin and Wagner’s minority model argu-
ment helps explain the Supreme Court’s reluctance to link contemporary ed-
ucational inequalities to past de jure racially segregated schools. By refusing
to make this causal linkage and to recognize a constitutional right to public
primary and secondary education, the Supreme Court continues to leave
black Americans at the mercy of conservative white local majorities. I argue
that past un-remedied educational inequalities have locked in advantages for
many whites. True educational equality requires both racial integration and
equal resource allocation.
a. The Persistence of Racial Inequality in Public Schools
The historical record indicates the importance newly freed black Amer-
icans placed on education.151 In fact, the push for public education by black
Americans was an important factor in the establishment of an efficient pub-
lic education system in the South following the Civil War.152 But whites
firmly resisted education benefits for southern blacks. “The American Freed-
men’s Commission report[ed] that Negroes’ ‘attempts at education provoked
the most intense and bitter hostilities, as evincing a desire to render them[ ]
equal to whites.’” 153
The second-class education blacks received in segregated public
schools across the nation, but especially in the Deep South, is well docu-
mented. W.E.B. Du Bois, writing in 1935, said, “If the Negro public school
cans isn’t likely to result in a shift in public policy.” Brian P. Marron, Promoting Racial
Equality through Equal Educational Opportunity: The Case for Progressive School-Choice,
2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 53, 102 & n.219 (2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
148 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 66-67. R
149 Id. at 72.  For a discussion of this point see supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text. R
150 Id. at 80.
151 W.E.B. Du Bois writes that in 1860, only 3,651 black children in the South attended
school because virtually all the slave-holding states had laws that prohibited teaching slaves to
read and write. Enforcement was lax in some states until the 1831 Nat Turner rebellion in
Virginia, after which “these laws were strengthened and more carefully enforced.” DU BOIS,
supra note 146, at 638. In contrast, by 1860, approximately three-quarters of free blacks in the R
United States were literate. Id. at 638.
152 Id. at 638-44.
153 Id. at 645.
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system had been sustained, guided and supported, the American Negro today
would equal Denmark in literacy.”154 Moreover, during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, seeking recourse in the courts would have been
futile.
The Supreme Court reinforced educational inequality in decisions like
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education.155 Cumming, decided
three years after Plessy v. Ferguson,156 illustrated the emptiness of the latter’s
promise that separate would be equal. The Court in Cumming ruled that clos-
ing the black, but not the white, publicly subsidized high school to provide
four primary schools for black children did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.157 It deferred to the political will of the conservative white voting
majority in Richmond County, Georgia, a majority arguably not committed
to educational equality for black Americans.
Many people continue to think that Brown v. Board of Education reme-
died this problem. However, they overlook the long-term consequences of
massive resistance by a majority of whites in the Deep South who opposed
desegregation of public schools.158 In the decades immediately following
Brown, whites throughout the South fled the public schools.159 When the
Court began to order desegregation of de facto segregated schools outside
the South,160 white families fled large northern and western cities for the
suburbs rather than submit to racially integrated schools.161 As Charles Law-
rence writes: “When white parents abandon urban public schools, the segre-
gated suburban and private schools their children attend replace the common
school as a marker of community membership and, in excluding poor black
and brown children, recreate the injury identified in Brown.” 162
154 Id. at 637. He continues: “The eagerness to learn among American Negroes was excep-
tional in the case of a poor and recently emancipated folk.” Id.
155 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
156 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
157 175 U.S. at 544-45 (accepting the school board’s assertion that the need for primary
schools was pressing and the decision to close the black school was based on financial
considerations).
158 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education and
Black America’s Struggle for Equality 751-78 (1975).
159 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Edu-
cation: The Court’s Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1604-09 (2003); Gary Orfield and David
Thronson, Dismantling Desegreation: Uncertain Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J.
759, 770-73 (1993); Diane Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of Meaning, in SHADES OF
BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 38-39 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
160 See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
161 Taunya Lovell Banks, Brown at 50: Reconstructing Brown’s Promise, 44 WASHBURN
L.J. 31, 54-55 (2004); see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S 67-81 (1969).
162 Charles R. Lawrence, III, On Race, Privacy, and Community (A Continuing Conversa-
tion with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L. J. 1353, 1360 (2005); see also
Banks, supra note 161, at 55 n.155 (“In November 1952, South Carolina voters approved a R
constitutional amendment eliminating the state’s duty to educate all children, thus allowing
conversion to a private school system to avoid racial desegregation. The governors of Missis-
sippi and Virginia considered submitting similar proposals . . .  Following [Brown] states
across the south passed tuition grant programs . . . .”) (citing Molly Townes O’Brien, Private
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\43-1\HLC103.txt unknown Seq: 30  4-JAN-08 9:55
156 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 43
Today the education of black children remains markedly unequal to that
of white children. Fifty years after Brown “school-aged children in the
[N]ation’s largest and most [racially] diverse cities are most likely to attend
highly segregated schools.”163  Today two-thirds of all black children, but
only one-quarter of white children, attend urban schools.164 The figures are
equally stark for poor Latino children who live in large urban areas.165 Over
the past decade, segregation in urban schools along racial lines has in-
creased.166 The increased resegregation occurred between 1991 and 1995 and
is linked to three Supreme Court decisions: Jenkins, Pitts, and Dowell v.
Oklahoma City,167 all of which severely limited school desegregation efforts
and facilitated a return to de facto segregated neighborhood schools.168
While the harm claimed by the petitioners in Brown was the racial iso-
lation of black children from white children,169 the Court in Grutter v. Bollin-
ger belatedly acknowledged that elite white children educated in isolation
from non-whites are harmed.170 A year before Brown’s fiftieth anniversary,
the Supreme Court in Grutter and its companion case Gratz v. Bollinger171
upheld the use of race as a factor in university admissions. Justice O’Connor,
writing for the majority in Grutter, noted that empirical studies show that
“student body diversity promotes [better] learning outcomes, and ‘better
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and bet-
ter prepares them as professionals.’” 172 However, she warned that race-con-
scious diversity efforts must be short-term.173
School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 385
(1997)).
163 Banks, supra note 161, at 32. Students in rural communities and small towns and large R
urban cities are more likely to attend racially integrated schools. Id. at 32 n.10 (citing GARY
ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare? 19 (Jan. 2004),
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf.).
164 Ryan S. Vincent, No Child Left Behind, Only the Arts and Humanities: Emerging Ineq-
uities in Education Fifty Years After Brown, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 127, 137 (2004).
165 See Erica Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RAP-
IDLY RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS 20 (2002), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.
ucla.edu/research/deseg/Race_in_American_Public_Schools1.pdf (reporting that, in 2000,
“some of the largest school districts like New York, Prince George’s County and Miami-Dade
[had] the highest levels of Latino segregation . . . [and that,] [s]imilar to black exposure
indices, many of the districts . . . where Latino isolation [was] highest [were] central city
districts with a small proportion of white students”).
166 Banks, Brown at 50, supra note 161, at 43 n.72. R
167 Dowell v. Oklahoma City, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
168 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 163, at 40. R
169 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
170 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
171 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program as
not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the University’s articulated compelling governmental
interest).
172 539 U.S. at 330.
173 Id. at 343 (“It has been 25 years since Justice Powell [in Bakke] first approved the use
of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher education.
Since that time, the number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed
increased. We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.”) (citations omitted).
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The Court’s focus in Grutter was racial diversity in higher education —
diversity among the leadership class — not racial diversity in primary and
secondary schools. Yet as Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Gratz, reminds us,
“[t]he stain of generations of racial oppression is still visible in our soci-
ety.”174  Continuing racial inequality is most apparent in this nation’s public
schools. Today the descendants of American slaves continue to be dispropor-
tionately concentrated in the worst public schools.175 Children who receive
inadequate education in primary and secondary schools too often lack the
skills necessary to gain admittance to the colleges and universities that edu-
cate the leadership class.
Some members of the Court acknowledge the linkage between inade-
quate educational preparation and the absence of blacks (and Latinos) from
these institutions of higher education.176 But a majority refuse to give public
school systems that adopt voluntary racial integration plans — plans adopted
in the absence of court orders or judicial interventions177 — the same latitude
it gives institutions of higher education. Even though the sharply divided
Court, in three opinions written during the last decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, acknowledged that “local autonomy of school districts is a vital na-
tional tradition,”178 as Wygant suggests, school boards are severely limited in
their ability to voluntarily remedy racial disparities in their schools.
Recently, a plurality of the Court in Parents Involved in Community
Schools characterized the school districts’ attempt to maintain racially inte-
grated public schools as “racial balancing,” concluding that this goal alone
is insufficient to withstand the strict scrutiny review mandated under the
Equal Protection Clause.179 Although five members of the Court disagreed,
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment because he believed that the
race-conscious measures adopted by the school districts were not sufficiently
narrowly tailored.180 The Court’s action in Concerned Parents seems anti-
democratic, rather than protective of the democratic process.
Justice Kennedy suggested several so-called “race-neutral” but “race
conscious” mechanisms to achieve a more diverse student body.181 Ulti-
174 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil
Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251,
1276-91 (1998)).
175 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 163, at 40. R
176 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J., and
Breyer, J.).
177 Deborah N. Archer, Moving Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Need for a More Nuanced
Standard of Equal Protection Analysis for K Through 12 Integration Programs, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 629, 636 n.45 (2007).
178 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 131 (Thomas, J., concurring); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490
(1992) (quoting Dayton v. Bd. of Educ., 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977)); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239,
1245 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
179 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2757 (2007).
180 Id. at 2791. Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens and Breyer dissented.
181 Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting non-racial mechanisms for achieving
diversity that include “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
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mately, the fractured decision in Parents Involved may have a chilling effect
on efforts to achieve racial diversity in public primary and secondary
schools. It also may encourage a few bad actors to more actively pursue
measures to promote resegregation.182
But in post-Brown America, racial integration alone is not the sole mea-
sure of true equality in public school. It never was. In discussions about
educational equality, race and class tend to get conflated, leaving unin-
formed people believing that racial integration alone is the measure of equal
educational opportunities for black and other non-white children. As a result,
many school advocates still tend to focus on ways to achieve racial integra-
tion and bemoan the limitations imposed by the Court in decisions like Par-
ents Involved in achieving this goal.
A few education advocates focus instead on funding equality. Chin and
Wagner suggest that funding inequality in public education is a byproduct of
black disenfranchisement. The authors argue that the disenfranchised black
voters in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were politically power-
less to effectuate funding equality for black and white children in public
schools.183 These funding inequalities, not directly addressed by Brown, were
exacerbated during the almost two decades of resistance to racial desegrega-
tion.184 In addition, the Court’s refusal to recognize public elementary and
secondary education as a constitutional right thwarted efforts to develop eq-
uitable school financing policies.185 The next section briefly discusses why
true educational equality must consist of racial diversity and resource
equality.
b. True Equality: Racial Diversity and Resource Equality
Most Americans still believe that Brown stands for the principle of ra-
cially integrated public schools. Yet many of the parent-petitioners in the
cases consolidated in Brown were suing for equal educational opportunity
for their children.186 Over the years education in a racially integrated school
became the surrogate for equal educational opportunity. In an earlier article,
I explained how the twin goals of Brown — equality and integration — got
conflated, concluding that the lawyers who litigated Brown and its progeny
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special
programs; recruiting students and faculty in targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, per-
formance and other statistics by race.”).
182 See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Alabama School Rezoning Plan Brings Out Cry of Resegrega-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at A1 (describing “a sweeping rezoning plan” adopted by
Tuscaloosa, Alabama school authorities that resulted in hundreds of black students who at-
tended racially integrated schools being “sent to virtually all-black, low-performing schools”).
183 Chin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 104. R
184 See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text. R
185 See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text. R
186 For a discussion of this point, see Banks, Brown at 50, supra note 161. R
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sacrificed educational equality for racial integration because, for them, racial
integration was an indicator of equal and full citizenship.187
Our public schools remain segregated along racial lines today due to
continuing disparities in the socioeconomic status of blacks and whites. Chin
and Wagner, along with others, argue that these disparities are consequences
of the Jim Crow era. White Americans, not burdened by the legacy of slav-
ery and de jure race segregation, are more affluent as a group than black
Americans.188  Daria Roithmayr refers to this difference as an example of the
“lock-in model” of inequality.189  She writes:
During the days of Jim Crow and slavery, whites acted anti-com-
petitively to exclude non-whites, and thereby gained an unfair
‘early mover’ monopoly advantage.  This initial . . . advantage may
now have become self-reinforcing, primarily because of the link
between early material advantage and future success in schooling,
employment, housing and wealth . . . . [R]acial disparities in those
areas may now have become locked in permanently, in the absence
of any radical institutional restructuring to dismantle the self-rein-
forcing advantage.190
One byproduct of this continuing economic disparity is that black
Americans tend to live in urban neighborhoods that have lower tax bases
than predominately white suburban neighborhoods, and public school fi-
nancing is still tied to local property taxes.191
Children from low-income neighborhoods enter school needing more
resources to perform on par with children from more affluent communi-
ties.192 Yet, because of the higher property tax bases in affluent suburban
areas and school financing schemes, the predominately white schools in
those areas have more financial resources and better teachers than predomi-
nately non-white urban schools.193 In some states, school financing schemes
187 Id. at 40-41.
188 See generally George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized So-
cial Democracy and the “White” Problem in American Studies, 47 AM. Q. 369 (1995).
189 See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination,
86 VA. L. REV. 727, 734 (2000); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC,
POL’Y & L. 197 (2004) (discussing continuing residential segregation).
190 Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, supra note 189, at 204. R
191 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Edu-
cation: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. (2003), reprinted in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION:
MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 29, 36 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
192 See JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 50-62 (2005); see also JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES:
CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 122-23 (1991) (describing differences in per pupil expendi-
tures among New York City area public school systems).
193 See EDUCATION TRUST, THE FUNDING GAP 2005: LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY STU-
DENTS SHORTCHANGED BY MOST STATES 1-2 (2005), available at http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/
rdonlyres/31D276EF-72E1-458A-8C71-E3D262A4C91E/0/FundingGap2005.pdf.
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have been challenged successfully based on state constitutional provisions.194
But at least one scholar argues that equal funding without economic integra-
tion in public schools will not result in substantive equality for poor black
and brown children.195
Increasingly, educational achievement for children of all races in the
United States is tied to socioeconomic status. A few scholars suggest eco-
nomic diversity rather than racial diversity as a way to achieve educational
equality in public schools.196 This method is used by a few schools to
achieve academic success across socioeconomic lines. School systems in
Raleigh, North Carolina, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, have successfully
used economic integration to achieve both racial integration and improved
black student performance.197
Some school systems even use economic integration as a facially neu-
tral means of getting more racially diverse student bodies. But other school
systems have learned that economic diversity does not necessarily result in
racial diversity. “Those [scholars] who have studied [economic diversity
plans] say a key to that outcome is how aggressively a plan shifts students
around and whether there are many schools that can lure middle-class stu-
dents from their neighborhoods into poor ones.”198
Economic diversity plans are a useful means of coping with existing
inequalities in cities with great socioeconomic diversity among their public
school populations. But in major cities with large non-white poor families
and few affluent families with children in public schools, economic diversity
is not an effective tool. There can be no meaningful economic integration
unless students are permitted to cross school district boundaries to take ad-
vantage of the tangible and intangible benefits available in more affluent
school districts.
Two Supreme Court cases make this solution difficult. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court declared that
public elementary and secondary education is not a fundamental right and
thus financial inequalities in school expenditures do not violate the Constitu-
tion.199 And in Milliken v. Bradley, the Court rejected busing across school
194 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Cam-
paign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003).
195 Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School
Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1620 (2007) (referring to the so-called third wave of
educational equity cases, which focuses on the “adequacy” of the education received in public
schools where per pupil expenditures are equal).
196 See Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integra-
tion of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1335 (2004); James E. Ryan, Schools,
Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 308 (1999); Angela Ciolfi, Note, Shuffling the Deck:
Redistricting to Promote a Quality Education in Virginia, 89 VA. L. REV. 773, 776 (2003).
197 Jonathan D. Glater & Alan Finder, Diversity Plans Based on Income Leave Some
Schools Segregated, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A24.
198 Id.
199 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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system lines to achieve racial integration.200 Milliken and Rodriguez effec-
tively consign poor minority children who live in poor urban areas to sub-
standard schools.
Today, many American urban school systems are in crisis. The disparity
in the quality of education provided by urban and suburban schools is a
legacy of the de jure and de facto racial segregation policies and practices.
Abandonment of urban public schools, primarily by affluent white families
(and increasingly by affluent black and brown families), and the vestiges of
racial segregation policies and practice only partially explain the lack of edu-
cational equality.
Federal aid that previously helped fill the financial gaps is declining or
being redirected by federal mandates like the No Child Left Behind Act
(“NCLB”).201 NCLB was promoted as helping to bridge the educational gap
between poor black and brown children and their white and Asian peers.202
These goals, while laudable, were flawed in their implementation. According
to some scholars, NCLB’s “conception, implementation, and the social
meaning revealed by the discourse and rhetoric it has spawned, perpetuate
and exacerbate the injuries inflicted upon poor black and brown children by
segregation, racism, and poverty.”203 Charles Lawrence argues that the Act’s
“greatest injury [is that it] eras[es] the history and conditions that have
caused the achievement gap it ostensibly seeks to close.”204 He contends
that, much like the Supreme Court’s contemporary approach to racially seg-
regated schools, NCLB “builds on the myth of formal equality.”205
Ryan S. Vincent claims that NCLB disempowers local communities,
especially black political majorities.206 He argues that NCLB disproportion-
ately increased educational costs to the poorest urban schools because they
are the schools most likely to have more subgroups (low-income black and
brown students, some with limited English proficiency or disabilities) that
trigger accountability under the Act.207 In practice, NCLB has actually sped
200 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
201 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
202 See Press Release, Rod Paige, Secretary of Education, U.S. Dept. of Educ., Paige Cites
Progress in Black Education But Notes Achievement Gap has Widened Over Past Two De-
cades (Nov. 19, 2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2003/10/1014
2003b.html (noting that achievement rates for black and Latino elementary and secondary
students lag behind those for white and Asian students).
203 Charles R. Lawrence, III, Who is the Child Left Behind?: The Racial Meaning of the
New School Reform, 39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 699, 700 (2006).
204 Id. at 706.  Lawrence continues: “[N]owhere does it speak of ending racism or dis-
mantling segregation. The Act’s proponents deplore the disproportionate injury that American
schools inflict upon poor black and brown children, but accept no responsibility for that injury
. . . . To listen to the discourse on No Child Left Behind is to hear a story of failing schools
without a history — a history of segregation, of inadequate funding, of white flight, of neglect,
of eyes averted and uncaring while the savage inequalities of American education grew even
wider.” Id.
205 Id.
206 Vincent, supra note 164, at 138. R
207 Id.; accord Lawrence, supra note 203, at 706. R
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up privatization of primary and secondary education — an anti-democratic
byproduct — and seems to foster resegregation of schools along the lines of
race and class.208
Finally, in reflecting on what happened to public schools in the fifty
years since Brown, I must acknowledge that the educational landscape has
changed dramatically. Many of the largest urban public school systems in
the United States are no longer black and white. Latinas comprise an in-
creasingly significant portion of today’s school-age population.209 Latina
children, like black children, tend to be concentrated in the worst urban pub-
lic schools.210 Thus, the discussion about educational equality in America
today is no longer a black and white issue.  In truth, it probably never was.
In an earlier article, I called for renewing the constitutional argument
that free public education is a fundamental right, but one that consists of two
components: substantive equality and education in a racially diverse envi-
ronment.211 If public primary and secondary education is deemed a constitu-
tional right, the Court would be forced to re-examine its decision in Milliken
rejecting busing across school system lines to achieve racial integration. But
legal efforts alone will not result in substantive educational equality for poor
minority children.
Without question, future efforts must be directed toward using the
courts to more vigorously attack state public school funding formulas. But
ultimately the role of courts in achieving Brown’s twin goals may be limited.
In the end, only a nationwide recommitment to free public education for all
— our noble experiment — will work. Charles Lawrence argues that we
need to “[c]reate cultures of excellence and high expectations in schools for
black, brown, working class, and poor students.”212 To do this, communities
must “[r]ecruit and nurture school leaders and teachers who believe in their
students[,] . . . [p]ay them well[,] . . . [r]educe class size[,] [p]rovide
safe, clean, well lighted, aesthetically-pleasing school buildings . . . [and]
[r]einstate the war on poverty.”213
The long-term consequences of historical black disenfranchisement
may help explain the current crisis in public education America now faces.
Given the Supreme Court’s refusal to make the causal connections needed to
help remedy this past wrong, national and local leadership by all racialized
208 Vincent, supra note 164, at 136. R
209 RICHARD FRY, THE CHANGING RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF U.S. PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, at i (2007), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=79
(“Latinos in 2005-06 accounted for 19.8% of all public school students, up from 12.7% in
1993-94.”).
210 Id. (“Roughly three-in-ten Hispanic (29%) and black (31%) students attended schools
in 2005-06 that were nearly all-minority(. . . [schools with] fewer than 5% of the students are
white), and these percentages were both somewhat higher than . . . 1993-94, when they stood
at 25% for Hispanic students and 28% for black students.”).
211 Banks, supra note 161, at 57. R
212 Lawrence, supra note 203, at 717. R
213 Id.
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groups is needed to impress upon Americans the importance to our future of
ensuring that rich and poor get equal educational opportunities. In the end,
the future quality of America’s urban public schools is a national, not simply
local, social concern.
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS: THE NEED FOR NEW LEGAL THEORIES
Chin and Wagner are right to suggest that new foundational theories are
needed to challenge racial discrimination. Midway through the last decade of
the twentieth century it became painfully apparent to racial justice advocates
that the civil rights theories of the 1950s that resulted in Brown v. Board of
Education and its progeny were outmoded.214 Civil rights advocate James
Farmer, former head of the Congress of Racial Equality, opined that civil
rights leaders of the 1960s did not have any long-range plans to capitalize on
and preserve the gains of that era and to combat the backlash that followed
the civil rights legislation of that decade.215
Now, as we near the second decade of the twenty-first century, we are
left to confront increasingly sophisticated race discrimination with legal
tools designed primarily to combat de jure race-based segregation216 and a
Court that selectively and unevenly applies the counter-majoritarian princi-
ple. Whether Parents Involved simply limits school boards’ options or sig-
nals the death-knell of Brown and the theories it bred,217 it is time to step
back and reconsider our future goals and the theories needed to achieve ra-
cial and social justice.
Daria Roithmayr’s call for “a major shift in thinking about anti-discrim-
ination law, away from the individual intent model and more towards the
conceptual metaphor of locked-in monopoly.”218 Chin and Wagner, by docu-
214 Derrick Bell writes that several decisions during the Court’s 1988 term shattered any
hope among forward-thinking civil rights advocates that the jurisprudence growing out of
Brown would withstand continued resistance to full citizenship for black Americans. DERRICK
BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 667 (5th ed. 2004).
215 Bob Herbert, Lessons Never Learned, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2006, at A35.
216 Colorism claims are just one example of the more sophisticated race discrimination
claims courts face today. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale,
47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1744 (2000); see generally Leonard M. Baynes, If It’s Not Just Black
and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Light-
ness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131 (1997);
Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000); Tanya Kateri
Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of Antidis-
crimination Laws, A United States-Latin America Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093
(2002).
217 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2837
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To invalidate the [racial balancing] plans under review is to
threaten the promise of Brown. The plurality’s position, I fear, would break that promise.”).
Arguably, if advocates could find a method that Justice Kennedy would approve, he could join
with the four dissenters to uphold the use of race as a factor in a future case.
218 Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, supra note 188, at 204. Other theoretical sources
include citizenship scholarship, see, e.g., Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk:
Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493
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menting the wholesale disenfranchisement of black voters in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century, provide a useful foundation for an attack
on the Court’s use of the counter-majoritarian principle whenever it reviews
race discrimination claims grounded in past inequities. Ultimately, multiple
approaches will be needed to rectify centuries of inequality. But for the mo-
ment, litigators should seriously consider using Chin and Wagner’s argument
and evidence to challenge the invocation of counter-majoritarian concerns in
voting rights cases.
(2007), which asks whether the advancement of racial or social equality should be couched in
citizenship terms; international human rights norms, see, e.g., Barbara Stark, Economic Rights
in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an Entirely New Strategy,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (1992); and perhaps even modern forward-looking constitutions in coun-
tries like South Africa, see, e.g., Ziyad Motala, Constitution Making in Divided Societies and
Equality: Reflections on the Israeli-Palestinian and South African Experiences, 50 HOW. L.J.
471 (2007).
